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INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, UASs, drones) are being used by a
wider variety of organizations, private citizens, and nations than ever
before.1 Although initially introduced into the public’s awareness via

*

J.D., PhD. Associate Professor, Department of Criminology, Law and Society and Senior
Fellow, Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, George Mason University.
**
PhD. Outcomes Researcher, ICON plc.
1. See CIARA BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., SURVEILLANCE STUD. CTR., QUEEN’S UNIV.,
SURVEILLANCE DRONES: PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPREAD OF UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLES (UAVS) IN CANADA 8–26 (2014), https://www.sscqueens.org/sites/sscque
ens.org/files/Surveillance_Drones_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP5L-MJKC]; see also
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST FISCAL YEARS
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media and policy discussions of military drone attacks in war zones, UAVs
have the potential to decrease costs and augment capabilities for many
industrial, security, and safety applications.2 For example, UAVs are
currently at work patrolling the large campuses of some corporations,
aiding search and rescue efforts in inaccessible areas, and even supporting
border security.3 Given these possibilities, many law enforcement agencies
have deployed or are considering drones for patrol, surveillance, and
security functions.4
UAVs are attractive to police departments because they may reduce the
costs of flight when compared with traditionally-piloted craft, like
helicopters.5 Although there is some disagreement about the extent of
actual cost savings in the literature, the cost to acquire and fly a UAV may
be much lower than a piloted craft, depending upon the capabilities of the
drone.6 These decreased operational costs may enable the use of flight for
new functions, such as the use of UAVs to collect intelligence when police
are faced with hazardous terrain or dangerous situations.7 UAVs may also
facilitate increased monitoring or photography of residential neighborhoods
or public spaces, such as parks, if police agencies opt to utilize the aircraft
in this manner.8
Due to their surveillance capabilities, UAVs can also prompt potentially
serious privacy and transparency concerns. Drones can be used for

2010–2030 48 (2010), http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/20102030/media/2010%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RR8-7MHL].
2. See Philip Boucher, Domesticating the Drone: The Demilitarisation of Unmanned
Aircraft for Civil Markets, 21 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 1393, 1394–98 (2014); see also Claudia
Stӧcker et al., Review of the Current State of UAV Regulations, 9 REMOTE SENSING 459
(2017).
3. See BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., supra note 1, at 14–15.
4. See generally BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., supra note 1; DAN GETTINGER, CTR. FOR THE
STUDY OF THE DRONE, BARD COLL., PUBLIC SAFETY DRONES (3d ed. 2020),
https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2020/04/CSD-Public-Safety-Drones-3rd-edition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z57X-9AKX].
5. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS:
MEASURING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS WOULD
FACILITATE INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 11 (2012).
6. See CHAD C. HADDAL & JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21698,
HOMELAND SECURITY: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER SURVEILLANCE 5 (2010);
see also JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS 10 (2012); Michael Salter, Toys for the Boys? Drones, Pleasure and Popular
Culture in the Militarisation of Policing, 22 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 163 (2014).
7. See BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., supra note 1; see also Reece A. Clothier et al., Risk
Perception and the Public Acceptance of Drones, 35 RISK ANALYSIS 1167 (2015).
8. See BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., supra note 1; see also Clothier et al., supra note 7; Jay
Stanley, We Already Have Police Helicopters, So What’s the Big Deal over Drones?, ACLU
(Mar. 8, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/mass-incarceration/we-already-havepolice-helicopters-so-whats-big-deal-over-drones [https://perma.cc/Q95Y-ERUB].
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surveillance by equipping the aircraft with cameras for recording pictures
or high-definition video.9 Although somewhat less common at the present
moment, drones may also be enhanced with specialized microphones or
utilize other noise-reduction methods for recording audio.10 The potential
intrusiveness of UAV surveillance may further be amplified by linking
UAVs with other advanced technologies, such as facial recognition,
infrared lenses, or heat sensors.11 Moreover, detailed information about
individuals’ activities may also be revealed by connecting different sources
of data together, such as by linking the products of UAV surveillance with
other police and government databases or even with consumer data.12
Since data linking could allow the viewing of an individual’s actions from
multiple vantage points and over sustained periods, it greatly increases the
information that is readily available to police and other government entities
and moves beyond the inferences that may be drawn from officer
observations or even single uses of advanced technologies, like drones.13
And advanced UAVs may stay airborne for long periods of time and collect
data from a height that renders the device imperceptible to those on the
ground, capabilities which may raise the specter of persistent, covert
surveillance in the minds of the public.14
Despite the increasing use of drones, a variety of issues remain relatively
unexplored in the literature. First, although much has been written about
UAVs, a large percentage of the literature examines the technology’s use

9. See Rachel L. Finn & David Wright, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Surveillance,
Ethics and Privacy in Civil Applications, 28 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 184, 187 (2012).
10. See Abdirahman Mohamud & Ashwin Ashok, Drone Noise Reduction Through
Audio Waveguiding (DroNet’18, Conference Paper, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1145/
3213526.3213543 [https://perma.cc/8D87-8ACJ]; see also Finn & Wright, supra note 9;
Hyohoon Ahn et al., Hybrid Noise Reduction for Audio Captured by Drones (International
Federation of Automatic Control, Conference Paper, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1145/31645
41.3175682 [https://perma.cc/EY7N-TCZW].
11. See Finn & Wright, supra note 9, at 188.
12. See Francesco Schiliro et al., iCOP IoT-Enabled Policing Processes, SERV.ORIENTED COMPUTING, 2019, at 447; see also Dan Bogdanov et al., Privacy-Preserving
Statistical Data Analysis on Federated Databases, ANN. PRIVACY F., 2014, at 30; Dinusha
Vatsalan, Peter Christen & Vassilios S. Verykios, A Taxonomy of Privacy-Preserving
Record Linkage Techniques, 38 INFO. SYS. 946 (2013).
13. See David Lyon, Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data, BIG DATA & SOCIETY, July–
Dec. 2014, at 1, 13; see also Linda Merola et al., Community Support for License Plate
Recognition, 37 POLICING 30 (2014); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A
Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the
Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 29 (1995).
14. See Chris Francescani, Domestic Drones Are Already Reshaping U.S. CrimeFighting, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2013, 10:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usadrones-lawenforcement/domestic-drones-are-already-reshaping-u-s-crime-fightingidUSBRE92208W20130303 [https://perma.cc/T64S-2CWW].
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by the military or in the international (rather than the domestic) context.15
Within the domestic literature, some surveys examine perceptions of police
drones,16 but most (by design) explore a wide variety of drone-related
issues to establish an early baseline for understanding the public’s opinions.
Thus far, however, the research has made clear that opinions of UAVs are
highly context- and function-dependent, suggesting that opinions will vary
widely based upon specific uses.17 At present, only a few studies
investigate public reactions to particular surveillance functions and the

15. See, e.g., Sarah Kreps, Flying Under the Radar: A Study of Public Attitudes Towards
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, RSCH. & POL., Apr.–June 2014, at 260; see also Sarah Kreps &
Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law, Military Effectiveness, and Public Support for
Drone Strikes, 53 J. PEACE RSCH. 830 (2016).
16. See generally Chantal Lidynia, Ralf Philipsen & Martina Ziefle, Droning on About
Drones: Acceptance of and Perceived Barriers to Drones in Civil Usage Contexts, in
ADVANCES IN HUMAN FACTORS IN ROBOTS AND UNMANNED SYSTEMS 317 (Pamela SavageKnepshield & Jessie Chen eds., 2017); Clothier et al., supra note 7; Miliaikeala S.J. Heen,
Joel D. Lieberman & Terance D. Miethe, The Thin Blue Line Meets the Big Blue Sky:
Perceptions of Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes Towards Aerial Drones, 31 CRIM.
JUST. STUD. 18 (2018); Mari Sakiyama et al., Big Hover or Big Brother? Public Attitudes
About Drone Usage in Domestic Policing Activities, 30 SEC. J. 1027 (2017); Alana Saulnier
& Scott N. Thompson, Police UAV Use: Institutional Realities and Public Perceptions, 39
POLICING 680 (2016); BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., supra note 1; KERRY G. HERRON, HANK C.
JENKINS SMITH & CAROL L. SILVA, U.S. PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND
UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
(2014),
http://crcm.ou.edu/pvcy2014/report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LF3P-P3GA]; JOEL D. LIEBERMAN ET AL., CTR. CRIME & JUST. POL., UNIV.
OF NEV. LAS VEGAS, AERIAL DRONES, DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE, AND PUBLIC OPINION OF
ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2014), https://www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/
27/Research-AerialDrones-DomesticSurveillance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R3XK-CSXE];
TERANCE D. MIETHE ET AL., CTR. FOR CRIME & JUST. POL., UNIV. OF NEV. LAS VEGAS,
PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT AERIAL DRONE ACTIVITIES: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY
(2014), https://www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/27/Research-PublicAttitudesabou
tAerialDroneActivities.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM9P-Q2JF]; P HOENIX STRATEGIC PERSPS.,
INC., SURVEY OF CANADIANS ON PRIVACY-RELATED ISSUES (2013), https://www.priv.
gc.ca/media/3323/por_2013_01_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR3A-UY52].
17. See Boucher, supra note 2; see also Anne Oltvoort et al., “I Am the Eye in the Sky —
Can You Read My Mind?” How to Address Public Concerns Towards Drone Use, in
PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: DEVELOPMENT OF PERSUASIVE AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE SUPPORT
SYSTEMS (2019); Francisco Klauser & Silvana Pedrozo, Big Data from the Sky: Popular
Perceptions of Private Drones in Switzerland, 72 GEOGRAPHICA HELVETICA 231 (2017);
Lauren Bowers Reddy & Daniel DeLaurentis, Opinion Survey to Reduce Uncertainty in
Public and Stakeholder Perception of Unmanned Aircraft, TRANSP. RSCH. RECORD, 2016, at
80; Yang Wang et al., Flying Eyes and Hidden Controllers: A Qualitative Study of People’s
Privacy Perceptions of Civilian Drones in The U.S., 3 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS.
172 (2016); SANDRA LYNN MACSWEEN-GEORGE, AM. INST. OF AERONAUTICS &
ASTRONAUTICS, A PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY — UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES FOR CARGO,
COMMERCIAL, AND PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION (2003); Alice Tam, Public Perception of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Purdue Univ. Aviation Tech. Graduate Student Publ’n, 2011);
MONMOUTH UNIV. POLLING INST., NATIONAL: U.S. SUPPORTS UNARMED DOMESTIC DRONES
(2013),
https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_nj_081513/
[https://perma.cc/8W5J-7R2Y].
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latest of these involved data collected in 2015.18 Thus, a goal of this
Article is both to update and to add further texture to existing findings in
this area.
To do so, the Authors fielded a survey of the U.S. public (n=606) with
the goal of examining opinions about the use of UAVs by a local police
department for a variety of monitoring functions.19 In this Article, we
focus on three scenarios wherein police are posited to use technology for
residential neighborhood photography and recording: (1) a police drone
that captures pictures or video from 1,000 feet in altitude, (2) a police drone
that captures pictures or video from 50 feet in altitude, and (3) (for
comparison’s sake) the same pictures or video captured via closed-circuit
television (CCTV) cameras located on the ground. The examination of
public opinions of police UAVs is important for several reasons. First, in a
democratic society, the public’s views should guide police department
policies regarding the adoption of new technologies and the uses and
preservation of the resulting data. Second, as the courts render decisions
concerning the uses of UAVs by police and other government actors, they
will — by necessity — draw conclusions about the scope of individuals’
“reasonable expectation[s] of privacy” with respect to these evolving
issues.20 A further goal of this Article is to provide detailed information
concerning the public’s actual expectations surrounding the use of UAVs.
As mentioned above, existing publications (while exceedingly helpful)
have analyzed data from 2015 and earlier. In the case of emerging
technologies, though, it is particularly important to update such work, as
individuals’ notions of privacy may evolve with technological change and
increased familiarity. In addition to reporting our survey results, we also
analyze this data using multivariable regression to better understand the
demographic factors and other opinions which correlate with respondents’
judgments of UAVs.
Part I of this Article begins by describing the legal context that governs
the use of UAVs by police agencies. Part II then reviews the existing
literature examining public opinions concerning police drones. Part III
details the data collection and methods used in our empirical analyses, and
Part IV presents our results. Finally, Part V contextualizes these results
and offers conclusions and policy recommendations on their basis.

18. See Sakiyama et al., supra note 16; see also Wang et al., supra note 17; LIEBERMAN
16. See generally Heen et al., supra note 16; HERRON et al., supra note
supra note 16.
19. For full results from the survey, see Linda Marie Merola & Ryan Patrick Murphy,
Towards a Greater Understanding of Opinions about Monitoring by Police Drones in the
U.S.: A Survey (on file with author).
20. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
ET AL., supra note
16; MIETHE ET AL.,
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I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT GOVERNING THE USE OF UAVS BY POLICE
In 2012, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization and
Reform Act21 was successfully passed by Congress and directed the
Secretary of the FAA to determine whether Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) operations could safely be operated in the national airspace system
(NAS) and if so, to “establish requirements for the safe operation of such
aircraft systems in the national airspace system.”22 In response, the FAA
developed a series of rules governing registration, safety, marking, and a
variety of other requirements for different classes of pilots, including those
operating UAVs for recreational, commercial, public safety or government,
and educational purposes.23 Moreover, in 2018, the FAA also introduced
LAANC, the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability
system, which allowed drone operators to receive flight authorizations in
real time and air traffic controllers to view drone activity in controlled
airspace.24 Though most of the efforts of the FAA have been directed
towards operations and safety, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) has published a set of best practices for
UAS privacy, transparency, and accountability, following a process by
which the agency convened UAS stakeholders, including other interested
government agencies.25 These best practices include informing others of
the use of UAS, showing care when operating the aircraft, limiting the use
of collected data, and protecting “covered” (or personally identifiable)
data.26
Yet, although these best practices represent efforts to promote privacy
and transparency in the context of UAVs, they are voluntary. Efforts to
enact UAV-specific restrictions on surveillance into law have been limited
at the federal level.27
In 2013, the Drone Aircraft Privacy and
Transparency Act and the Preserving American Privacy Act were

21. See Pub. L. No. 112-095, 126 Stat. 11 (2012).
22. See id. 333(c); see also id. § 331(9) (defining Unmanned Aircraft System).
23. See generally Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Mar. 8,
2022, 1:08 PM), https://www.faa.gov/uas/ [https://perma.cc/45JL-FP8M].
24. See UAS Data Exchange (LAANC), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 19, 2022, 9:10
AM), https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/data_exchange/ [https://perma.cc/9Z
CB-RP5A].
25. See NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES FOR UAS
PRIVACY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 3–6 (2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/publications/voluntary_best_practices_for_uas_privacy_transparency_and_account
ability_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AGK4-WNSJ]; see also Angela Simpson, Finding Common
Ground on UAS, NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN (May 19, 2016), https://www.ntia.
doc.gov/blog/2016/finding-common-ground-uas [https://perma.cc/RNE2-S6LX].
26. See NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., supra note 25.
27. See Stanley, supra note 8.
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introduced in Congress, but neither of these bills were passed into law.28
Thus, under the existing framework, the FAA holds exclusive authority for
many areas of UAV regulations. In taking such a position, the FAA argued
that UAVs fall under the authority of the national government because of
the national interest in a functional NAS.29 In support of this, the FAA has
cited the grant of lawmaking authority given to the U.S. Congress under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, arguing that Congress has
preempted the “field” of air regulation and that “[w]here Congress occupies
an entire field . . . even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”30
Despite this preemption, however, there are certain types of issues
related to UAVs that may be preserved as the appropriate subject of state
and local lawmaking under the grant of state and local police power, such
as those related to “land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law
enforcement operations.”31 Consequently, there remain particular issues
that are open to state and local lawmaking either because they fall into
zones for which there is concurrent authority with the federal government
(such as privacy) or because they fall into categories where authority has
traditionally been reserved to the states.32 At the state level, since 2013, at
least 44 states have passed some form of legislation relating to UAS
operations, but these laws vary greatly from state to state, and many of
these statutes were passed with the goal of encouraging the development of
the drone industry (as opposed to regulating it).33 For example, bills of this
sort include those which allocate funding to initiate drone programs at
universities, establish UAV centers, or launch collaborations between
educational institutions and businesses.34 Another frequent area of
attention for UAV legislation involves issues of safety and security. For
example, one of the most popular pieces of legislation at the state level
prohibits the flying of UAVs above correctional facilities; legislation

28. See H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. (2013) (Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act);
see also H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013) (Preserving American Privacy Act)..
29. See OFF. OF THE CHIEF COUNS., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND LOCAL
REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 1 (2015) [hereinafter
FAA FACT SHEET], https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/policy_library/media/UAS_Fact_
Sheet_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2X3-ZWNB].
30. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012).
31. FAA FACT SHEET, supra note 29, at 3.
32. See id.
33. See Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unma
nned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx [https://perma.cc/FA9U-VGZ2].
34. See, e.g., ALASKA. STAT. § 14.40.082 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.210 (2019);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (2020); H.B. 1109, 66th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019).
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prompted in part by the use of UAVs to transport illicit items into these
facilities.35
A review by the Authors of all existing state-level drone legislation
through the year 2020 reveals that there have been 31 pieces of UAV
legislation containing provisions relating to police agencies and that these
have been enacted by 18 different states.36 By our count, there have been
172 total pieces of UAV-related legislation enacted across all states
between 2013 and 2020, meaning that legislation relating at least partially
to police agencies represents approximately 18% of the total enactments.37
Many of these statutes prohibit the use of UAVs by police without a
warrant, but even in states with relatively strict laws, the legislation then
routinely enumerates a list of exceptions allowing certain warrantless uses
of UAVs.38 For example, the Florida drone statute begins by declaring that
“[a] law enforcement agency may not use a drone to gather evidence or
other information.”39 Following this, it then allows the use of UAVs in the
following cases:
[(1)] To counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or
organization if the United State Secretary of Homeland Security
determines that credible intelligence indicates . . . such a risk . . . . [(2)] If
the law enforcement agency first obtains a search warrant signed by a
judge authorizing the use of a drone . . . . [or (3)] If . . . law
enforcement . . . possesses reasonable suspicion that, under particular
circumstances, swift action is needed to prevent imminent danger to life
or serious damage to property, to forestall the imminent escape of a
suspect or the destruction of evidence, or to achieve purposes including,
but not limited to, facilitating the search for a missing person.40

Thus, most drone statutes have enumerated exceptions that allow law
enforcement agencies some latitude with respect to their use of UAVs, such
as in the variety of situations mentioned in the Florida statute at number
three above. These uses require law enforcement to possess only enough
evidence to meet the lower threshold for reasonable suspicion, as opposed
to the higher standard of probable cause that would be required for a
warrant.

35. See Alejandro Sanchez & Cameron McKibben, Worst Case Scenario: The Criminal
Use of Drones, COHA (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.coha.org/worst-case-scenario-thecriminal-use-of-drones/ [https://perma.cc/XX49-LVCV].
36. See Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, supra note 33.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-300.1 (2015); S.B. 92, 2013 Leg. (Fla. 2013).
39. S.B. 92 § 1(3).
40. Id. § 1(4)(a)–(c).
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In this way, although those states that have enacted drone legislation
have tended to limit potential uses, the statutes also tend to contain
enumerated exceptions which can allow law enforcement to use drones for
photography or surveillance in certain situations. Moreover, certain states
have included an even larger list of exceptions, many times adding
functions such as assessing the damage during natural disasters,
documenting traffic accidents, photographing crimes scenes, or even
allowing the use of UAVs for training or public relations purposes.41
Although many of these permissible UAV uses could reasonably be
considered to be limited to specific events or to certain discrete
geographical areas, one could envision situations where at least some
photography of individuals or property not directly related to the incidents
or occurring in broader areas could potentially occur.
Further, with respect to the question of surveillance of property
specifically, many state UAV statutes also include a specific exemption
that permits warrantless flights over real property if a police agency secures
the property owner’s consent.42 Consent is a well-recognized exception to
the warrant requirement because courts have reasoned that there can be no
reasonable assertion of an expectation of privacy in items or property that
an owner has voluntarily agreed to reveal to the police.43 However, despite
the inherent logic of this position, the consent doctrine has sometimes
allowed for evidence to be considered admissible despite the property
owner’s objections, such as when courts have accepted “apparent
authority” arguments made by police who have obtained consent from
someone they reasonably believed was the owner of the property at the
time but who later turned out not to be.44 One could also envision
situations where the joint ownership of property might allow for one owner
to consent to the search over the objections of another; this could apply to
either the common areas of a property (in the case of roommates, for
example) or even to the entire property, such as in situations involving
married couples or where one co-owner with control over a space gives
consent and the other is not physically present to object.45 Thus, if
doctrines of this sort were to be extended to the UAV scenario, exceptions
of this type might potentially be used to override the wishes of a property

41. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.19 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 21-213 (2020); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (2022); UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-14-203 (2022).
42. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 837.310 (2021); S.B. 840 § 1(A)6, 85th Leg. (Tex.
2017); S.B. 155, 2016 Leg. (Vt. 2016).
43. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
44. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181–82 (1990).
45. See Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 302 (2014); see also United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
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owner or to permit some types of warrantless UAV photography over real
property. And, of course, there is the potential problem of individuals who
feel pressured to consent or who do so without full knowledge of the
implications of their waivers of rights.46
Likewise, many UAV statutes also contain a general exemption for
“judicially recognized exceptions to warrant requirements.”47 Since the
particular exceptions that comprise this category are not enumerated, their
precise scope in each state is likely to be filled in via judicial interpretation
and extension of each state’s case law as parties challenge individual UAV
flights. One exception that seems highly likely to be included (and, in
several states, has even been specifically enumerated) would be that of
allowing UAVs to be used in exigent circumstances.48 In efforts to restrict
the scope of monitoring that would occur pursuant to such an emergency,
some states, like Illinois, have time-limited the use of UAVs under this
exception to a discrete emergency or to a specific time period. For
example, Illinois limits exigent circumstances uses of UAVs to 48 hours
and requires “the chief executive officer of the law enforcement
agency . . . [to] report in writing the use of the drone to the local State’s
Attorney” within 24 hours of its use.49 Yet, even where the emergency use
of UAVs has been limited in some manner, the declaration of an
emergency conceivably permits some surveillance to occur (for example,
during the 48 hours of a declared emergency).50 Further, most state statutes
do not place a time limit on exigent circumstances uses of UAVs,
presumably intending to rely upon the judiciary to determine the
reasonableness of an emergency use and, following this, to apply the
exclusionary rule to any collections of evidence deemed unreasonable.
Indeed, with respect to the exclusionary rule, about half of the stateUAV statutes also explicitly contemplate an exclusionary remedy for
violations by police, thereby including language which makes any evidence
collected in contravention of the statute inadmissible. However, it needs to
be recognized here that the exclusion of evidence is only available to those

46. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 509 (2016); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps
and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156; Roseanna Sommers &
Vanessa K. Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: Consent Searches and the
Psychology of Compliance, 128 YALE L.J. 1962 (2019); Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but
Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80
IND. L.J. 773 (2005).
47. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-14-203(1)(b) (2022); S.B. 155, 2016 Leg. (Vt.
2016).
48. See, e.g., S.B. 92 § 1(4)(c), 2013 Leg. (Fla. 2013).
49. Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act, Pub. Act 098-0569 § 15(3) (Ill. 2013).
50. See id.
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with a legitimate expectation of privacy in a particular searched area; for
example, in the drone case, non-owners who are captured on video taken
from a drone would likely not have the ability to challenge a piece of
evidence even if the search was deemed illegal as to the owner of the
property.51 Moreover, there are a number of judicially-recognized
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, which, if extended to UAVs, might
allow prosecutors to use the evidence collected even against an owner. For
example, the “good faith” exception allows for the use of evidence that
would otherwise be considered illegal in situations where officers have
acted in good faith yet still violated an individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy.52 In the federal courts, for example, this has been applied in
cases where warrants contained mistakes or even where the police entered
the wrong home entirely due to a mistaken address.53 Thus, in these ways,
the ability of individuals to challenge such evidence collections may be
limited by the courts.
Finally, it must also be recognized that the mechanism of the
exclusionary rule, itself, generally only applies where prosecutors seek to
introduce evidence at a criminal trial. For this and other reasons, some
states have gone even further to create a civil cause of action for anyone
subjected to unlawful surveillance via a drone.54 The Idaho statute, for
example, further includes a provision awarding either “actual and general
damages” or liquidated damages in the amount of $1,000 (whichever is
greater), plus attorney’s fees and litigation costs, for instances of unlawful
surveillance via UAV.55
The discussion above, however, is particular to the 18 states which have
passed legislation relating to police UAVs. In the other states, the
judgments of the courts as to the breadth and depth of one’s protections in
relationship to drones assume even greater importance because no specific
legislation has been enacted. As cases arise, state courts are likely to rely
upon provisions of their state constitutions and existing state and federal
case law. Likewise, since no dedicated drone legislation has been passed at
the federal level to manage the privacy issues specific to drone
proliferation, the key consideration related to monitoring and police UAVs
will be the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.56 The Fourth Amendment is, of course, directly applicable to

51. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
52. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 80 (1987); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981, 986–87 (1984).
54. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (2020).
55. See id. § 21-213(3)(b).
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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agents of the federal government and also constrains the operation of statelevel actors (such as the police) through the operation of the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment.57
To determine the scope and applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
police searches more generally, the Supreme Court has applied the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” criteria derived from the case of Katz
v. United States.58 Katz, itself, involved the question of whether the
Federal Bureau of Investigation had violated the Fourth Amendment when
agents attached a warrantless listening device to the outside of a public
telephone booth.59 Although the booth was located in public, the Court
decided that this action violated the Fourth Amendment because Katz had
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy through his actions, such
as closing the door to the booth.60 Moreover, Katz’s expectation was
considered by the Court to be objectively reasonable because members of
our society do not expect the government to be routinely monitoring
conversations in public telephone booths.61
Under the Katz test, then, the justices assess what is “reasonable” in the
context of society’s expectations of privacy.62
Thus, individuals’
expectations of the scope of privacy become important to understanding
what the Constitution protects. In this way, until Congress enacts privacy
legislation specific to the drone context, it will be the justices’ assessments
of individuals’ expectations that are likely to be determinative in many
situations. For this reason, the survey analyzed below was created with the
intent of providing updated evidence relevant to this test and, specifically,
with respect to which surveillance functions the public views as
“reasonable.”
Since drones are a relatively new technology, the most relevant
information regarding the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
at the present time can be gleaned from an examination of the Court’s
decisions concerning law enforcement surveillance via piloted flights.
Although these cases occurred prior to the development of UAVs, they
provide guidance as to the rules that govern law enforcement flights for the
purposes of photography or surveillance. Historically, the Court has
allowed most monitoring from the air if conducted from altitudes where

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id. at 349–50 (majority opinion).
See id. at 359.
See id.
See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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police had the legal right to be.63 In California v. Ciraolo, officers used a
piloted airplane to fly over the defendant’s fenced backyard at 1,000 feet in
the air to investigate a tip that marijuana was growing there.64 In response,
the Court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in this area since members of the public flying in an aircraft would
similarly be able to view this area.65 Likewise, Florida v. Riley posed a
similar issue.66 In that case, officers received a tip that marijuana was
growing inside a greenhouse, an area that could not be viewed from the
ground.67 This time, officers utilized a helicopter flying at 400 feet to view
what was growing inside through openings in the greenhouse roof.68 The
Court again held that this action (taken without a warrant) did not violate
Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy because members of the general
public could also do the same.69 Indeed, in the opinion, the Court made the
point of observing that the police did not interfere with Riley’s use of his
greenhouse or any other areas of his curtilage.70
Similarly, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) utilized a piloted flight to take pictures of a
chemical plant in Midland, Michigan after the company denied permission
for the agency to conduct a follow-up inspection of the facilities.71 The
Court ruled in favor of the EPA, arguing that the authority of the agency
“carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally
employed or useful to execute the authority granted.”72 In so holding, the
Court likened the outside areas of an industrial complex to “open fields,” or
areas where a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist. Indeed, the
Court reasoned, the fact that the EPA could take these pictures from public
airspace meant that other members of the public could do the same.73
Taken together, these three cases likely mean that law enforcement will be
permitted by the Court to utilize UAVs to fly over property in public
airspace for the purposes of conducting photography or surveillance.74

63. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
64. 476 U.S. at 209.
65. See id. at 216.
66. 488 U.S. at 450.
67. See id. at 448.
68. See id. at 451–52.
69. See id. at 451.
70. See id. at 452.
71. 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
72. Id. at 233.
73. See id. at 231.
74. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986);
Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239.
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However, this may not be the case if law enforcement captures pictures of
areas of a property that are not viewable by the general public or if a UAV
flies lower than in the cases discussed above.
The case of United States v. Causby may be of particular interest on this
point.75 In Causby, the Court held that a property owner had the right to
exclude flights that were “so low and so frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.”76 The
precise extent of this height limitation remains an open question, but we do
know from the cases discussed above that piloted flights of limited duration
at altitudes of 400 and 1,000 feet were deemed high enough to be in
publicly-navigable airspace and, therefore, legal without a warrant.77 Yet,
Causby would suggest that this calculation may be altered if police were to
opt to fly drones either very frequently or at low altitudes because this
might be deemed to interfere with an owner’s use or enjoyment of their
property.78
And, more recently, the Court has also recognized the potential for
technological advances to continue to curtail the zones of privacy afforded
by the Fourth Amendment.79 Since 2012 alone, the Court has issued a
series of landmark rulings concerning the privacy of electronic data in the
police context, including the protection of information in arrestees’ cell
phones, the unconstitutionality of using a beeper to warrantlessly monitor a
vehicle’s movements, and the requirements governing police access to
cellphone location data.80 In these cases, the Court has relied upon the
well-known “reasonable expectations of privacy” formulation from Katz v.
United States but has also expressed a recognition that technological
advancements now allow police to gain access to materials and information
about individuals that previously would only have been accessible via a
traditional search conducted pursuant to a warrant.81 Thus, a similar line of
reasoning may be applied by the Court if police were to operate a UAV in a
way that would seem to constrict customary notions of the zone of privacy
surrounding a home.

75. 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).
76. Id. at 266.
77. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450; see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. See generally Gregory
S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354, 396
(2016).
78. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 266.
79. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
80. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (describing police
accessing cellphone data); see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (regarding
arrestee’s cellphone); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (pertaining to beeper
tracking vehicle).
81. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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II. PUBLIC OPINIONS OF UAV MONITORING
As discussed above, the public’s reasonable expectations of privacy
inform the extent of Fourth Amendment protections under the Katz test.82
Yet, although some surveys have examined overall perceptions of police
drones, most studies have not focused specifically on questions of privacy
or the use of UAVs in residential neighborhoods but rather have adopted a
wide-ranging approach to gauge responses to drone use more generally.83
This literature makes clear, however, that the public believes that the
expansion of police UAVs will increase surveillance, threaten privacy, and
create accountability problems because individuals will not be able to
confront those conducting the surveillance, know what is being recorded,
or where the data is sent.84 Notably, Professor Burchan Aydin conducted
an experiment showing that the public perceived UAVs equipped with
cameras to pose a greater risk than those without cameras.85 The
experiment also further found the public to be generally concerned about
UAV monitoring by police.86
Only a few studies examine public reactions to specific police
surveillance scenarios in the United States.87 Professor Kerry Herron et al.
reported only 34% support for police using “drone cameras to continuously
monitor streets and businesses.”88
Support was higher for drone
monitoring of “large public gatherings” (47% support) or “train terminals,

82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Lidynia et al., supra note 16; Clothier et al., supra note 7; Sakiyama, supra
note 16; Saulnier & Thompson, supra note 16; BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., supra note 1;
HERRON ET AL., supra note 16; LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16; MIETHE ET AL., supra note
16; PHOENIX STRATEGIC PERSPS., supra note 16.
84. See, e.g., Lidynia et al., supra note 16; Oltvoort et al., supra note 17; Burchan
Aydin, Public Acceptance of Drones: Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice, 59 TECH. IN
SOC’Y 101180 (2019); Philip Boucher, ‘You Wouldn’t Have Your Granny Using Them’:
Drawing Boundaries Between Acceptable and Unacceptable Applications of Civil Drones,
22 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 1391 (2016); Victoria Chang, Pramod Chundury & Marshini
Chetty, “Spiders in the Sky”: User Perceptions of Drones, Privacy, and Security, 2017 CHI
CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 6765; Heen et al., supra note 16; Jake R.
Nelson et al., The View from Above: A Survey of the Public’s Perception of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles and Privacy, 26 J. URB. TECH. 83 (2019); Wang et al., supra note 17;
HERRON ET AL., supra note 16; LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16; MIETHE ET AL., supra note
16; MARIA VALDOVINOS ET AL., CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
COMMUNITY POLICING AND UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS): GUIDELINES TO
ENHANCE COMMUNITY TRUST (2016).
85. See Aydin, supra note 84, at 8.
86. See id. at 10.
87. See generally Sakiyama et al., supra note 16; Wang et al., supra note 17; HERRON ET
AL., supra note 16; LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16; MIETHE ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.
88. HERRON ET AL., supra note 16, at 35.
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bus stations, and airports” (46% support).89 However, approval of these
UAV uses may be higher than for others because these functions are both
time- and area-limited and are focused on serious and specific security
concerns. Likewise, a survey conducted by Professor Miethe et al.
similarly found large majorities of respondents to oppose more general
UAV monitoring “around their homes” (93%), at the “workplace” (77%),
or in “open public places” (63%).90 However, a study by Professor
Sakiyama et al. found some disparate results in their 2014 sample: 74%
support for “[t]raffic monitoring” and only 47% support for “[c]rowd
monitoring.”91 Perhaps the high levels of support for traffic monitoring
stem from differences in public opinion regarding this UAV monitoring
function.
Overall, though, privacy appears to represent a significant concern, but a
relatively limited number of specific surveillance scenarios have been
tested so far. Moreover, opinions of UAV monitoring may have altered
considerably since 2014. From a theoretical standpoint, the intervening
years may have altered opinions in a variety of ways: by increasing
familiarity with drones, but also by potentially heightening surveillance
concerns as technologies of this type have proliferated and databases have
become increasingly linked. Research examining the content, storage, and
linking of police UAV data has yet to be conducted, but investigations of
other technologies have suggested that the large majority of data collected
and stored by police consists of observations of legal activities by ordinary
individuals.92 The public may find this troubling because any large data
collections inevitably contain mistakes in the data, can be targets for
hacking, and can be used in unauthorized ways which may pose risks to
average individuals, their reputations, finances, and even freedom, such as
in instances when data is used as evidence in court.93 As data collections
expand, individuals increasingly lose the ability to control how they are
perceived, how data are used or protected, and who may access the
information.94 Studies by both Professor Chang et al. and Professor Wang
et al. have noted that participants expressed a variety of concerns about

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1–2.
Sakiyama et al., supra note 16, at 1033.
See ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING
USED TO RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 2–3, 7 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/def
ault/files/field_document/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5EA-WD
HC].
93. See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 ILL.
J.L., TECH., & POL’Y 281, 328 (2011); see also Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 560 (2006).
94. See Solove, supra note 93, at 513–16.
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UAV data collection itself, including those related to data protection,
unauthorized access, and data ownership.95
In our multivariable results section below, we utilize our survey data to
model public support for UAVs in the police context using regression.
Professor Sakiyama et al. also utilized regression to examine responses to
three potential examples of UAV monitoring or surveillance functions
conducted by local police: (1) “traffic monitoring,” (2) “detecting criminal
activities,” and (3) “crowd monitoring.”96 In the case of all models,
respondents’ concerns over surveillance and beliefs about privacy were
found to significantly predict responses.97 Additionally, a variety of
demographic variables were also found to be significant, although the
precise combination of significant demographic predictors was different for
each model.98 From their models, the authors concluded that the key
predictors of attitudes about police UAVs are individuals’ beliefs about
privacy, libertarian views about individual rights, and concerns about
surveillance generally.99 Although the authors found younger respondents
and non-whites to be less supportive of UAVs, they reported that such age
and race effects disappeared once controls were introduced representing the
heightened privacy and surveillance concerns exhibited by these groups in
the sample.100
Similarly, using data from their 2015 survey, Professor Heen et al. also
utilized regression to predict support for ten police UAV functions, which
they categorized as either “proactive” or “reactive” policing functions.101
Then, they averaged participants’ responses to create measures
representative of each category.102 “Proactive” policing involves actions
that the police take on their own initiative, while “reactive” policing
functions are those which occur when members of the community call
police to a particular location.103 The authors found the key significant
predictors of public attitudes toward police UAVs to be respondents’
perceptions of police legitimacy and the extent to which participants
believed the use of UAVs would enhance public safety.104 In the case of
proactive policing functions, however, the authors reported that
95. See Chang et al., supra note 84, at 6765, 6769; see also Wang et al., supra note 17,
at 177–81.
96. See Sakiyama et al., supra note 16, at 1037–38.
97. See id. at 1036.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Heen et al., supra note 16, at 24–26, 29.
102. See id. at 26.
103. See id. at 20–21.
104. See id. at 30.
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respondents’ levels of concern over privacy in the context of UAVs were
also significant.105 Though Professors Sakiyama et al. and Heen et al. do
not explicitly examine residential UAV monitoring, we follow their leads
and include similar independent variables in our models below.
III. DATA AND METHODS
To extend this line of literature, the Authors present regression models
of public support for drone monitoring by police in the residential context.
To do so, we utilize data from a 2018 online survey of the U.S. public
(n=606) conducted via Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online
labor market where requesters post Human Intelligence Tasks (HITS) for
completion by MTurk users.106 MTurk is often used by survey researchers
seeking low-cost access to a diverse subject pool.107 Analyses of MTurk
samples have shown them to be as reliable as traditionally-collected data
and much more representative than convenience or area samples.108 Most
of the existing research examining UAVs and public opinion has similarly
relied upon MTurk for sample recruitment.109
A. Survey Instrument
The MTurk listing solicited participation using a general descriptor
(technology survey). Upon clicking the link, participants then encountered
the IRB-approved consent document. The survey’s key substantive
portions consisted of two short vignettes presented on separate pages.110

105. See id.
106. See Amazon Mechanical Turk, MTURK, https://www.mturk.com/ [https://perma.cc
/KJ9G-SCNT] (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).
107. See Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, 44 BEHAV. RSCH. METHODS 1, 3 (2012).
108. See Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online
Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL.
ANALYSIS 351, 355–61, 366 (2012); see also Tara S. Behrend et al., The Viability of
Crowdsourcing for Survey Research, 43 BEHAV. RSCH. METHODS 800, 812 (2011); Michael
Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New
Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSPS. ON PSYC. SCI. 3, 5 (2011); Scott
Clifford, Ryan M. Jewell & Philip D. Waggoner, Are Samples Drawn from Mechanical
Turk Valid for Research on Political Ideology?, RSCH & POL., Oct.–Dec. 2015, at 1, 6–9;
Joseph K. Goodman, Cynthia E. Cryder & Amar Cheema, Data Collection in a Flat World:
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples, 26 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 213, 222 (2013).
109. See MIETHE ET AL., supra note 16, at 2; see also Nelson et al., supra note 84, at 85;
Lisa M. PytlikZillig et al., A Drone by Any Other Name, IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG. 80, 82–
83 (2018); LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 2.
110. The survey also contained three additional vignettes related to UAV use by police.
Specifically, these invovled: (1) a UAV used to follow an individual and record pictures and
video in public spaces, (2) a UAV used to record pictures and video of public spaces more

2022]

UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC’S OPINIONS

781

The vignettes described the use of a police UAV: (1) to record pictures or
video of the outside of a home and its surrounding property from 50 feet in
the air and (2) to record pictures or video of the outside of a home and its
surrounding property from 1,000 feet in the air. Respondents indicated the
strength of their agreement or disagreement with each UAV use on a 5point Likert scale.
On each page, participants were instructed to consider whether police
should be allowed to legally take each action without getting a warrant
from a judge. This instruction was given to clarify that respondents should
consider the legal acceptability of these actions without judicial preapproval. This distinction is important because, if the police possess
enough evidence of criminal activity to secure a warrant, then the duration
and scope of surveillance would be limited by that warrant. Other than
these mentions of a “warrant,” legal terms or “buzz” words like “privacy”
or “spying” were excluded from the survey in favor of concrete
descriptions to aid comprehension.
For comparison, we further included a vignette describing identical
pictures and video captured via a camera attached to a closed-circuit
television system (CCTV). The vignette specified that the camera was
situated in such a manner that it would capture video of a residential
neighborhood but that it was located on a public street. CCTV is in
widespread use in the United States and has been deployed by police for at
least two decades.111 We included the CCTV vignette to compare
responses concerning a more longstanding police technology that can
produce a similar surveillance output. In a study led by Professor Herron,
researchers conducted a similar type of comparison, finding that public
support for UAV cameras was lower than for their ground counterparts.112
Moreover, Professor Saulnier and Professor Thompson showed that
Canadians approved of many police functions at higher rates when
conducted via more traditional, piloted crafts (e.g., helicopters) versus
UAVs.113 Studies by Professor Wang et al. and Professor Fischhoff et al.

generally, such as in parks, and (3) a decision by police to store public-space UAV
recordings for a period of one year. The Authors plan to discuss these additional scenarios in
future work.
111. See generally Nicholas R. Fyfe & Jon Bannister, City Watching: Closed Circuit in
Public Spaces, 28 AREA 37, 37 (1996); Lorraine Mazerolle, David Hurley & Mitchell B.
Chamlin, Social Behavior in Public Space: An Analysis of Behavioral Adaptations to CCTV,
15 SEC. J. 59, 59 (2002); Katherine S. Williams & Craig Johnstone, The Politics of the
Selective Gaze: Closed Circuit Television and the Policing of Public Space, 34 CRIME, L. &
SOC. CHANGE 183, 183–88 (2000); MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RSCH. BUREAU, CRB-97-005,
PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: IS IT AN EFFECTIVE CRIME PREVENTION TOOL? 1 (1997).
112. See HERRON ET AL., supra note 16, at 12, 34–37, 44–47.
113. See Saulnier & Thompson, supra note 16, at 687.
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have also produced results suggesting that this method of comparing
technologies can yield insights.114 We adopt this approach and extend it to
previously-untested surveillance scenarios.
All vignettes were presented in random order, and participants were
prevented from returning to previous questions. Following the section of
the survey containing the vignettes, respondents then encountered a series
of questions asking about any potential concerns they might have regarding
technology use by police. A list was provided and respondents were
directed to check any items that were concerning to them.115 Finally, all
respondents also answered both a series of demographic questions and five
police perceptions items.116 The section of the survey containing the five
police perception items came at the beginning of the survey for half of the
sample and at the end of the survey for the other half of the sample to
counter any potential impact of the substantive questions on the perceptions
of police and vice versa.117
B. Sample Characteristics and Limitations
To participate, respondents were required to be U.S. citizens and at least
18 years of age. We further required respondents to spend at least five
minutes with the survey to encourage substantive consideration of the
questions. Data retained in the sample was also screened for correct
answers to five “attention check” questions which were embedded within
the survey but associated with objectively correct answers. Respondents
who failed any attention check question or who did not spend sufficient
time on the survey (n=47) were excluded from the data set. Participants
received $1 in remuneration. Lastly, the Authors checked all IP addresses
and rejected responses that did not originate from a U.S. IP address (n=4).
Following these exclusions, a total of 606 participants remained. Since the
vignettes were marked as required questions, each also totals 606
responses.
Individuals from a wide range of geographic locations (all 50 U.S.
states) participated, yielding sample characteristics very similar to those
found in the 2010 U.S. Census.118 For example, our sample’s gender
distribution (50% male) did not significantly differ from the population

114. See Wang et al., supra note 17, at 175; see also Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is
Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits,
9 POL’Y SCIS. 127, 128 (1978).
115. See “concerns related to police technology use” in infra Section III.B named
“Multivariable Analyses” for a detailed list of these concerns.
116. See infra Section III.B.
117. See infra app. A.
118. See, e.g., Sakiyama et al., supra note 16, at 1036; Heen et al., supra note 16, at 25.
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(49.2% male), t(605) = 1.47, p = .143. Likewise, our sample’s average age
(37.9 years) was not significantly different from the population (37.2
years), t(605) = 1.43, p = .154. Also, the proportion of respondents who
considered themselves to be White did not significantly differ between our
sample (74.9%) and the population (72.4%), t(605) = 1.43, p = .154.
We did, however, find a significant difference when we compared the
proportion of African American respondents in our sample (8.6%) with the
Census (12.6%), t(605)=-3.53, p<.001. Only limited literature so far has
examined the extent to which race-based differences in opinions exist in the
context of UAVs, and this literature has not yet produced clear expectations
as to whether race might correlate with opinions of police UAV use in the
scenarios examined by our survey. For example, Professor Sakiyama et al.
found non-whites to be less supportive of UAV usage in certain
circumstances but found no significant differences with respect to other
functions.119 Likewise, Professor Heen et al. reported that African
Americans were significantly less likely to support the use of UAVs for
“reactive” policing functions but found that race did not predict differences
in opinions of UAVs used for “proactive” policing functions.120 We
examined the correlations between race and responses to our vignettes but
found no significant correlations in our data (both p>.05).
However, we note this sample characteristic as a limitation because,
theoretically, such a link seems reasonable. Existing literature has
demonstrated that minority group members distrust police at higher rates
and are more frequently dissatisfied with police performance than are white
residents.121 It would not be surprising, then, if these higher levels of
average distrust and dissatisfaction might render African Americans less
likely to support UAV use because UAVs can have the effect of
empowering police to a greater extent. Since we find highly negative
reactions to UAV monitoring in our sample, however, it is unlikely that the
inclusion of greater numbers of minority group members would have
altered the direction of our results. Rather, it seems likely that a more
inclusive sample would have expressed even greater disapproval than our
findings suggest.
Respondents accessed the survey via an internet-connected device and
were users of the MTurk service. Thus, our sample may have been more

119. See Sakiyama et al., supra note 16, at 1036–37.
120. See Heen et al., supra note 16, at 28–29.
121. See, e.g., MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMITH & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 215243, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC
(2005),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LVF-X878];
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING 293, 300–01 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl
eds., National Academies Press, 2004).
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technologically savvy and potentially of higher socioeconomic status than
are average members of the public. Research so far does not suggest that
responses to UAVs differ systematically along these dimensions. Yet, it
seems possible that increased technological sophistication might be
correlated with greater knowledge or more positive views of emerging
technologies when compared with the general public. Since we find that
substantial majorities perceived UAVs negatively, however, it is unlikely
that a more technologically-averse sample would alter the direction of our
findings.
C. Multivariable Analyses
To examine factors that may influence support for drone use by police in
the residential context, we estimated a series of linear regression models
utilizing the answers to each vignette as a dependent variable in one
model.122 Responses to these vignettes were provided on a 5-point Likert
scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree), where an answer of “5”
indicated strong support for allowing police to utilize a drone to perform
the particular function. Respondents’ answers to other survey questions
were then utilized as the independent variables in these regressions.
Although we examine three vignettes (UAV monitoring at 1,000 feet, UAV
monitoring at 50 feet, and CCTV monitoring of a residential
neighborhood), we present a total of six regression models (two for each
vignette). We do so to closely replicate the approach taken by Professor
Sakiyama et al., who presented two models per vignette — one model
containing only demographic predictors and a second model containing
both demographics and other opinions that might correlate with opinions of
police UAVs.123 This approach allows readers to compare results from
both the demographics-only and the full models. As discussed below, the
full models add several independent variables that are not found in the
demographics-only models, namely respondents’ concerns about police
technology use, their perceptions of police, and their levels of crime
concern.
Concerns Related to Police Technology Use. As mentioned above,
following the substantive vignettes, participants were then asked about any
potential concerns they might have regarding technology use by the police.
A list of concerns was provided and respondents were directed to check all

122. Given the ordinal nature of our dependent variable, we also performed these
analyses utilizing ordinal logistic regression but found the results to be substantially similar.
Consequently, we present the linear regression results here for the sake of ease of
interpretation.
123. See Sakiyama et al., supra note 16.
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items which applied to them. Specifically, the following concerns were
presented as options: (1) “I have concerns about the data being
misunderstood or misinterpreted by the police or government.”; (2) “I have
concerns about too many people ‘watching me’ or monitoring my activities
too often.”; (3) “I have concerns about the data being misused or databases
being hacked to get personal information.”; (4) “I have concerns about how
long the information collected is stored.” Responses to each of these items
were dummy coded (Concern Selected = 1, All Others = 0) and
incorporated as independent variables into the regressions.
Perceptions of Police. Participants also responded to a series of
statements related to perceptions of police which were included because
there is some evidence that perceptions of this type may influence the
extent to which individuals are willing to allow an agency latitude to adopt
new technologies.124 Moreover, one recent survey experiment found
evidence that reading short vignettes about the use by police of another
advanced technology, automated license plate recognition (LPR), prompted
respondents to express significantly lowered trust in police.125 To assess
perceptions of police, the survey asked respondents to indicate the strength
of their agreement or disagreement (on a 5-point Likert scale) with the
following statements: (1) “Police in my community respect citizens’
rights.”; (2) “Police in my community treat citizens fairly.”; (3) “Police in
my community treat people equally.”; (4) “Police in my community treat
citizens with respect.”; (5) “The police department in my community
makes good decisions.” A factor analysis of these items suggested that the
first four overlapped, so we combined them into a scale with a range of 0 to
4 (Police Fairness, Equality, and Respect or PFER Scale) (see table 1).126
The fifth item was not included in the scale because it appears to be a
distinct factor in these data.
Crime Concern. Additionally, we incorporated a measure of concern
over crime to account for the possibility that it may influence individuals’
willingness to support UAV use by police. Some prior research has
suggested that crime concern may be relevant to public approval of

124. See, e.g., Heen et al., supra note 16; Ben Bradford et al., Live Facial Recognition:
Trust and Legitimacy as Predictors of Public Support for Police Use of New Technology, 60
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1502 (2020); Linda M. Merola & Cynthia Lum, Predicting Public
Support for the Use of License Plate Recognition Technology by Police, 15 POLICE PRAC. &
RSCH. 373, 373–88 (2014).
125. See Linda M. Merola, Cynthia Lum & Ryan P. Murphy, The Impact of License Plate
Recognition Technology (LPR) on Trust in Law Enforcement: A Survey-Experiment, 15 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 55, 60 (2018).
126. See app. A, Table 1.
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advanced technologies.127 In this case, participants were asked “How
concerned are you about crime happening near where you live?” and
responded on a 4-point scale (Very, Somewhat, Slightly, or Not At All).
After examining the descriptive statistics, however, we collapsed these
categories into a binary indicator due to the limited numbers of individuals
placing themselves at the higher end of the scale. Thus, the independent
variable utilized below combines the “Very” and “Somewhat” groups
together (Moderate/High Concern = 1) and contrasts those with individuals
in the lower two categories (Low/No Concern = 0). Once coded in this
manner, 35.8% of respondents expressed moderate/high concern and 64.2%
expressed low/no concern over crime.
Demographics. Finally, participants also responded to a variety of
demographic questions, which are included in the regressions as control
variables. The gender dummy variable (male = 1, female = 0) may be
relevant because gender differences in the likelihood of arrest or citation
may produce differences in support for the use of advanced technologies by
police.128 We also included a control variable related to age, measured as a
continuous variable. As age increases, so may support for UAV use by law
enforcement, since older individuals tend to be more supportive of police,
more concerned about crime, and less likely to commit infractions that
police will be called to investigate.129 A few studies so far have suggested
that older individuals are also generally more approving of police
surveillance technologies, such as CCTV and automated license plate
recognition, but existing UAV studies have found mixed results when
examining correlations between age and support for UAV surveillance
functions usage, with some reporting significant differences in support

127. See, e.g., Martin Gill, Jane Bryan & Jenna Allen, Public Perceptions of CCTV in
Residential Areas: “It Is Not As Good As We Thought It Would Be.,” 17 INT’L CRIM. JUST.
REV. 304, 304–24 (2007); Heen et al., supra note 16 (examining the relationship between
public safety concerns and UAVs used for reactive and proactive policing functions);
Merola & Lum, supra note 124.
128. See, e.g., John Allen & Elizabeth Monk-Turner, Citizen Perceptions of the
Legitimacy of Traffic Stops, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 589 (2010); Richard J. Lundman & Robert L.
Kaufman, Driving While Black: Effects of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on Citizen SelfReports of Traffic Stops and Police Actions, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 195 (2003).
129. See, e.g., Ben Brown & Wm Reed Benedict, Perceptions of the Police: Past
Findings, Methodological Issues, Conceptual Issues and Policy Implications, 25 POLICING
543 (2002); Steven Chermak, Edmund F. McGarrell & Alexander Weiss, Citizens’
Perceptions of Aggressive Traffic Enforcement Strategies, 18 JUST. Q. 365 (2001); Chris L.
Gibson et al., Social Integration, Individual Perceptions of Collective Efficacy, and Fear of
Crime in Three Cities, 19 JUST. Q. 537 (2002).

2022]

UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC’S OPINIONS

787

based on age, while others did not.130 Thus, the association between these
two variables remains somewhat undetermined.
Additionally, we incorporated an independent variable representing race.
Although (as described above), the extent of a correlation between race and
opinions of police UAVs is not yet clear in the literature, we opted to
control for this variable because race is highly relevant to perceptions of
police. Members of minority groups are more likely both to perceive and
to experience instances of disrespect and violence when dealing with the
police than are non-minorities.131 Minority group members also distrust
police at higher rates and are more frequently dissatisfied with police
performance than are non-minorities.132 Moreover, in addition to the racerelated findings in the existing literature described above, some further
research suggests that race may influence support for other advanced police
technologies, like automated license plate recognition technology.133
Within the regression models, race is operationalized utilizing a series of
dummy variables (first, White = 1, All others = 0, and, then, African
American =1, All others = 0).
We also included control variables reflecting political partisanship,
which were derived from a survey item where respondents were asked to
self-identify as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent. Prior
research has found that more conservative individuals may trust legal
authorities (including police and the government) at higher than average
rates, which suggests that partisanship may, therefore, be theoretically
relevant to a willingness to allow police more latitude to experiment with
advanced technologies.134
The political partisanship variable was
operationalized as a pair of dummy variables reflecting either an
individual’s identification as a Republican (Republican = 1, All others = 0)
or as an individual independent of political party affiliation (Independent =
1, All others = 0). Lastly, a dummy variable reflecting each respondent’s

130. See MIETHE ET AL., supra note 16; see also Sakiyama et al., supra note 16; Gill et
al., supra note 126; Merola & Lum, supra note 124; LIBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16.
131. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 121. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO,
TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS
(2002).
132. See, e.g., DUROSE ET AL., supra note 121; Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and
White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322,
323 (2005).
133. See Merola et al., supra note 125.
134. See Emily Elkins, Who Really Likes the Police? Older, Richer, White, Conservative
Republicans, REASON (Oct. 24, 2014, 8:46 AM), http://reason.com/poll/2014/10/24/whoreally-likes-the-police-older-richer [https://perma.cc/GJ5A-KLAT]; see also Jeffrey M.
Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP (June 19, 2015),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6YPX-U72A].
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education level (college degree or higher = 1, All others = 0) was also
included for control purposes.135
IV. RESULTS
A. Survey Responses
As can be seen in Figure 1,136 large majorities of our respondents
expressed disagreement with the decisions to use UAVs for the functions
discussed in our vignettes. Sixty-four percent of respondents expressed
either strong disagreement or disagreement with UAVs used to record
pictures or video of property from 1,000 feet in the air. When presented
with the same scenario referencing a UAV flying at 50 feet, a full 78.2% of
the sample expressed either strong disagreement or disagreement. In
addition to the overall negativity of responses, these results suggest that the
height at which a UAV flies may be a factor in determining acceptability
for some members of the community. Similarly, a high percentage of the
sample (62.4%) indicated disapproval when asked about CCTV cameras
situated in a way that would capture recordings of the outsides of homes
and their property. Thus, regardless of the mode of capturing the
recordings, both technologies produced similar negative responses.
B. Multivariable Analyses Predicting Support for Drone Usage
Table 2 presents six regression models which correspond to the three
UAV and CCTV vignettes discussed above.137 For each vignette, we
present two models (for a total of six). As discussed above, we do so to
follow the lead of Professor Sakiyama et al. in previous research.138 For
each vignette, the first model contains only demographic variables as
predictors, while the second model adds independent variables related to
crime concern, privacy concerns, and perceptions of police. Table 2
reveals that many of the significant variables overlap regardless of the
vignette’s focus on monitoring via UAVs at 50 or 1,000 feet or monitoring
via CCTV.139 In this way, at least for scenarios focused on residential
monitoring, similar predictors tend to be important across disparities in
altitude and types of monitoring technology.
First, looking at the demographics-only models, it appears as if the
control variables related to partisanship and education significantly explain

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See app. A, Figure 1.
See app. B.
See app. C.
See Sakiyama et al., supra note 16.
See app. C.
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at least some of the variation in opinions regarding UAV monitoring.
Table 2 reveals that college-educated respondents were significantly more
likely to support UAV monitoring of neighborhoods by police at 1,000 feet
in altitude. Although the distinction between college-educated and noncollege-educated respondents yielded a significant coefficient in the model,
it is important to note that overall support for this UAV function remained
low in both groups. Specifically, for non-college-educated respondents,
only 25.9% of the sample expressed support of any kind. In comparison,
for college-educated respondents, this percentage was 30.8%. In the case
of drone monitoring at 50 feet, the distinction between college-educated
and non-college-educated respondents did not yield a significant
coefficient. With respect to lower-altitude monitoring, 11.8% of collegeeducated respondents supported this function, while 12.3% of non-collegeeducated respondents expressed approval. As can be seen by these results,
support for lower-altitude drone monitoring was extremely low. Thus,
overall approval of this function may be so low that it cuts across
educational differences. Moreover, the education variable was once again
significant in the demographics-only model related to the use of CCTV in
neighborhoods. Specifically, 27.9% of college-educated respondents
supported this use of CCTV, while only 19.8% of non-college-educated
respondents supported it. Overall, however, like drone monitoring from
either high or low altitudes, there was relatively little support among these
respondents for this type of monitoring.
Political independents were also significantly less likely to support the
use of a UAV for 1,000-foot monitoring than were respondents in the base
category (Democrats). In fact, only 19.1% of Independents expressed
support for the use of police UAVs for high-altitude monitoring. The
coefficient attached to the “Republican” dummy variable also approached
statistical significance (p = .085) but was positive, meaning that — in this
particular sample — Republican respondents were more likely to support
UAV monitoring at 1,000 feet. 37.3% of those identifying as Republican
respondents supported the use of UAVs for this type of neighborhood
monitoring. In comparison, 30.9% of Democrats in our sample supported
this function. Moreover, we find a similar pattern when examining the
demographics-only model related to UAV monitoring at 50 feet. As Table
2 shows, this time, the dummy variable attached to Republican Party
identification yields a significant and positive coefficient. 18.6% of those
identifying as Republicans supported 50-foot UAV monitoring, compared
with only 7.5% of Independents and 12.5% of Democrats. In the 50-foot
monitoring scenario, the independent variable denoting political
independence very nearly approaches the customary significance level of
.05 (p = .051). Further, Republicans were also significantly more
supportive of CCTV used for residential monitoring, with 33.1%
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supporting it, compared with 25.4% of Democrats and 16.6% of
Independents.
The dummy variable related to identification as African American also
approached (but did not meet) the customary .05 significance level (p =
.097) in the 1,000-foot monitoring scenario. In this particular sample,
however, African American respondents were less likely to support this
type of UAV monitoring by police (19.2% support), whereas 29.3% of
those self-identifying as white expressed support for this. We do not,
though, find similar results with respect to race in the 50-foot monitoring
scenario. In the case of lower-altitude surveillance, 11.5% of those selfidentifying as African Americans supported this, while 12.4% of those selfidentifying as white felt similarly. Further, the variables related to race
also did not yield significant distinctions with respect to CCTV monitoring.
Twenty-three percent of African American respondents supported
residential CCTV monitoring, while 25.3% of white respondents felt
similarly.
In the CCTV monitoring model, we further find the age variable to be
significant, with older respondents expressing greater support for CCTV
surveillance. Although age is not significant in the regression models
predicting support for UAV monitoring at either 50 or 1,000 feet, we note
that there exists a remarkably consistent pattern of increasing approval of
police UAV use amongst each higher age cohort within our survey.
Additionally, the Pearson correlation for both UAV vignettes was
significant; the Pearson correlation between age and approval of
monitoring by a police UAV at 1,000 feet was R = .16, p < .001, while the
correlation between age and approval of monitoring by a police UAV at 50
feet was R = .09, p = .027. Thus, although age does not appear to be
significant once other demographic predictors are controlled for, there is a
consistent relationship between increased age and (somewhat) higher
support for UAV monitoring. Yet, although older individuals are
consistently more supportive of residential UAV monitoring, support
remains generally low even amongst respondents in the highest age cohorts
(with means near or below the mid-point of the response scale).
In comparison, the full models (which include variables accounting for
privacy concerns, concerns about crime, and police perceptions) yield
distinct results. In several cases, demographic variables are no longer
significant once these opinions are added to the models. In model 4, those
respondents who identified as political independents remain significantly
less likely to support UAV monitoring at 1,000 feet, while model 6
suggests that college-educated respondents are more likely to approve of
police surveillance of neighborhoods via CCTV. However, it is an
examination of the additional opinion-related variables that yields the most
substantive results in these more-inclusive models. For one thing, across
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both technologies and regardless of the height at which a police UAV is
posited to fly, a respondent’s level of concern about crime in his or her
neighborhood appears to be an important predictor. Indeed, those placing
themselves in the higher categories of crime concern (somewhat/very
concerned), consistently approved of UAV monitoring in greater numbers
(1,000-foot UAV monitoring = 36.4%; 50-foot UAV monitoring = 17.1%;
CCTV monitoring = 30.0%) than did those with fewer concerns about
crime (1,000-foot UAV monitoring =23.9%; 50-foot UAV monitoring =
9.3%%; CCTV monitoring = 20.5%). Moreover, the coefficients attached
to the variable representing higher levels of crime concern were relatively
large compared with most coefficients in the models (1,000-foot UAV
monitoring = 0.40; 50-foot UAV monitoring = 0.37; CCTV = 0.32). Since
support for drone use under each of these circumstances was expressed on
a 5-point scale, the movement of an individual from little/no concern about
crime to somewhat/very concerned about crime represents a shift of up to
8% of the full length of the scale. As an example, with respect to higheraltitude monitoring, if all other variables are set at their minimum values,
such a change in an individual’s level of concern over crime from low to
high is enough to move that participant from a baseline support value of
2.35 (mildly negative concerning UAV surveillance at 1,000 feet) to an
expression of near-neutrality (or a value of 2.75) on the same scale. Thus,
the practical impact of concern over crime is not trivial.
Additionally, respondents’ opinions of their local police also appear
significant to their support of or opposition to UAV monitoring. Across all
models and vignettes, an increase in an individual’s score on the police
fairness, equality, and respect (PFER) scale corresponded significantly with
increased approval of both UAV and CCTV monitoring. Interestingly,
however, the coefficients are larger in the model pertaining to CCTV
monitoring than in the UAV models, meaning that the PFER variable is
correlated with even greater impacts on opinions about CCTVs. In
comparison to the coefficients attached to crime concern, however, the
impact of PFER beliefs is much more modest (representing only about 1%
of the response scale). As an example, with respect to higher-altitude
monitoring, if all other variables are set at their minimum values, an
individual with the highest level of belief in the fairness, equality, and
respect of police (4) would average a value of 2.59 (mildly negative) with
respect to UAV monitoring at 1,000 feet. In contrast, a respondent with the
lowest belief in the fairness, equality, and respect of police (1) would, on
average, express an opinion located at a value of 2.35 regarding UAV
monitoring at 1,000 feet. Thus, the practical impact for views on police is
significant but more modest when compared to concern over crime.
As mentioned above, however, the coefficient attached to opinions about
PFER is larger (0.23) in the case of the CCTV model. As an example, in
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the final included in Table 2, if all other variables are set at their minimum
values, an individual with the highest belief in the fairness, equality, and
respect of police (4) would average a value of 2.52 (mildly negative
concerning CCTV monitoring). In contrast, a respondent with the lowest
belief in the fairness, equality, and respect of police (1) would, on average,
express an opinion of CCTV monitoring located at a value of 1.6 (quite
negative). This represents a much larger change in average opinions of
CCTVs as individuals hold less positive perceptions of police. Moreover,
the relationship between another factor concerning the public’s opinion
about police (the belief that “police make good decisions”) also appears
different in the model concerning CCTV monitoring. The belief that police
make good decisions was not a significant predictor in either drone model.
However, in the case of the final model related to CCTV monitoring, this
predictor approached (but did not meet) the threshold for statistical
significance (p = .064). In and of itself, this coefficient was moderatelysized (0.17).
In addition to concerns about the prevalence of crime and police
perceptions, the models further suggest that a variety of technological and
data storage concerns are highly relevant to opinions about the use of these
technologies within residential areas. Not too surprisingly, respondents
who indicated that they were generally concerned about “the numbers of
people watching me” (67% of the sample) also expressed significantly
lowered approval of police UAV and CCTV use across all models, with
coefficients ranging from -0.27 to -0.42. When comparing across the
models, however, we see that the coefficient attached to this independent
variable is the smallest in magnitude when respondents considered UAV
monitoring of property from 1,000 feet in the air (-0.27). Surveillance from
such a height may have felt more removed or less intrusive to respondents
than did cameras closer to the ground or on the ground. When compared
with the coefficients attached to some of the other independent variables,
however, it should be noted that the coefficients attached to this concern
are relatively large across all of the models. Indeed, this one factor seems
to weigh as heavily in the minds of respondents as does concern over crime
(discussed above).
Further, a second technology-related concern also yields significant
coefficients across all models.
A concern “over the data being
misunderstood by government or police” negatively corresponded with
support for UAV monitoring, this time with coefficients ranging from -0.25
to -0.37. In fact, within the overall sample, a large percentage (74.6%) of
respondents indicated concern about this issue. This finding is interesting
because it suggests the potential for issues arising after the data are
collected (such as issues with data interpretation) to be just as concerning
to the community as the existence of the surveillance itself. The magnitude
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of the coefficient attached to this independent variable and the fact that it is
significant across all models suggest that individuals are concerned about
the ways in which these data may shape the judgments made about them by
criminal justice actors. In fact, in these models, this one concern alone can
move an individual in the negative direction between 5% and 7.4% on the
support scale. Interestingly, although relatively large percentages of the
sample indicated concerns related to data storage (46.9%) and data hacking
(83.7%), the variables representing these concerns did not yield significant
coefficients in explaining views about residential surveillance by UAVs or
CCTVs. If respondents had been given vignettes related to other functions,
perhaps these concerns might have been significant.
V. DISCUSSION
Police departments are increasingly deploying advanced technologies,
such as UAVs, body-worn cameras, and automated license plate
recognition.140 Yet, like many advanced police technologies, UAVs may
be used for a wide range of functions with varying costs and benefits. One
potential concern raised in the literature is that the proliferation of UAVs
can facilitate easy and inexpensive surveillance.141 Indeed, our results
suggest a public that is seriously concerned about this potential in the
residential context; specifically, disapproval of the use of UAVs by local
police departments in the scenarios described by our survey ranged from
64% to 78.2% of the sample. Moreover, in the low-altitude drone scenario,
the number of respondents expressing strong disapproval approached 50%.
The comparatively higher levels of opposition to pictures or videos taken
at a reduced altitude of 50 feet suggest that proximity was a factor in
determining acceptability for some respondents. A few previous studies
have documented participant concerns over close-proximity drones during
detailed interviews, but ours is the first to report this distinction on a larger
scale.142 Interestingly, privacy scholars and others have emphasized the
extent to which higher-altitude monitoring can be particularly problematic
because it would be impossible for individuals to shield their activities

140. See, e.g., James Byrne & Gary Marx, Technological Innovations in Crime
Prevention and Policing: A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact, 20 J.
POLICE STUD. 17 (2011); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 410 (2015); Reiman, supra note 13; Rushin, supra note
93; Tyson E. Hubbard, Note, Automatic License Plate Recognition: An Exciting New Law
Enforcement Tool with Potentially Scary Consequences, 18 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP.
3 (2008).
141. See Stanley, supra note 8.
142. See Chang et al., supra note 84; see also Wang et al., supra note 16.
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from imperceptible recording devices.143 Likewise, in their survey,
Professor Bracken-Roche et al. found that a mere 13% of Canadians
expressed approval when asked generally if UAVs should be permitted to
fly “too high to be seen.”144 Our sample’s disapproval in the 1,000-foot
scenario accords with the direction of this finding, but it is interesting to
note that, although the majority of our sample also disapproved, greater
numbers of our respondents (28.3%) expressed approval than in the earlier
study. This may stem from differences in the acceptability of the entity
using the UAV (in our case, the police), from national differences, or from
some other source. Further research is needed to establish in greater detail
how factors such as these alter the public’s calculus about the acceptability
of UAV surveillance.
Although CCTV has been in use for much longer in the United States,
we found similarly negative responses to the use of CCTV cameras to
accomplish monitoring in residential neighborhoods. Specifically, 62.4%
of the sample indicated disapproval when asked about CCTV cameras in
residential settings — a nearly-identical percentage of the sample that
indicated disapproval of high-altitude UAVs used in this way. The CCTV
result further underscores the idea that respondents generally disapprove of
decisions to conduct this type of surveillance, regardless of the type of
technology used. To a certain extent, the finding of similar levels of
disapproval across technologies contradicts some results from Professor
Herron et al.’s study, which found that public support for UAV cameras
was lower than for their ground counterparts.145 However, Professor
Herron et al.’s survey was conducted much earlier in the development of
UAVs, so an evolution of opinions may be one reason for the difference.146
Additionally, the difference may stem from our survey’s focus on
residential neighborhoods, where the public’s disapproval of surveillance
may be particularly robust. Professor Herron et al.’s survey comparing
responses to either drone-based or ground-based cameras described the
devices as “cameras used to continuously monitor streets and businesses,” a
wording which may have suggested a commercial (rather than a residential)
context.147 Thus, it is possible that the mention of businesses produced a
higher level of support for ground-based cameras (in their case, 58%
approval) because surveillance around commercial areas may feel more

143. See, e.g., Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming! Will the Fourth Amendment Stop
Their Threat to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1279, 1333 (2013); Wang et al., supra
note 16; Francescani, supra note 14; Stanley, supra note 8.
144. See BRACKEN-ROCHE ET AL., supra note 1, at 42.
145. See HERRON ET AL., supra note 16, at 29.
146. See id. at 1.
147. Id. at 35.
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common in today’s society and, perhaps also, less intrusive than residential
monitoring. Although we cannot be certain of the reasons for the
differences between our study and Professor Herron et al.’s, this
explanation makes sense because Professor Herron et al.’s mention of
drone cameras “used to continuously monitor streets and businesses” also
produced a finding of greater support (34%) than did either of our drone
monitoring scenarios.148 Both of our scenarios were limited to the
residential context, a limitation that seems to have produced lower levels of
support.
Another interesting aspect of focusing on the residential context can be
found in the fact that our respondents seem to have perceived CCTV
similarly to high-altitude drone flights. Although disapproval was high in
all scenarios across our survey, some respondents actually expressed
approval of both CCTV and higher-altitude UAV flights but expressed
disapproval of lower-altitude flights. For these respondents, low-altitude
flights may have seemed more intrusive — either in terms of surveillance
output or potentially other factors, such as noise or safety. Since our study
is the first to examine these particular scenarios, we did not attempt to
conduct a survey experiment where details regarding the types of cameras
or conditions like noise or the size of the UAV were varied. That is a
direction for future research. However, one possibility is that some
respondents thought a higher-flying UAV might not be able to capture the
same level of detail as a lower-flying UAV. It is also possible that our
respondents’ consideration of the low-altitude vignette may have been
influenced by their perceived greater awareness of being watched by a craft
flying lower. In fact, this may also provide an explanation as to why the
results for CCTV cameras on the ground were similar to the 1,000-foot
UAV; people tend to forget about the high prevalence of surveillance
cameras within our society because the cameras are relatively small and
often unobtrusively placed. Greater awareness of surveillance, however,
may increase an individual’s self-consciousness and, therefore, may have
caused our respondents to express greater discomfort with the 50-foot
vignette. Indeed, there is existing research in the field of psychology which
documents the effects of the perception of “being watched.”149 If this
explains our results, however, it is interesting that respondents felt such
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Carol L. Esmark, Stephanie M. Noble & Michael J. Breazeale, I’ll Be
Watching You: Shoppers’ Reactions to Perceptions of Being Watched by Employees, 93 J.
RETAILING 336 (2017); Moe Fathi, Melissa Bateson & Daniel Nettle, Effects of Watching
Eyes and Norm Cues on Charitable Giving in a Surreptitious Behavioral Experiment, 12
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCH. 878 (2014); Costas Panagopoulos & Sander van der Linden, The
Feeling of Being Watched: Do Eye Cues Elicit Negative Affect?, 19 N. AM. J. PSYCH. 113
(2017).

796

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

discomfort in the 50-foot scenario merely by reading about and imagining
such surveillance (as opposed to experiencing it firsthand).
Existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent has allowed police to surveil the
areas of an individual’s property that are observable by other members of
the public, including by flying over the property to take warrantless highresolution photographs at 400 and 1,000 feet.150 Our results suggest that a
majority of average individuals do not support granting police this
permission and hold an expectation that the areas surrounding their homes
and property will not be photographed or recorded by police technologies
without a warrant. Thus, the public seems to hold different expectations of
privacy than are reflected in the Ciraolo and Riley cases.151 Our findings in
this respect are consistent with the few existing empirical studies that have
examined other types of residential monitoring scenarios.152 In the case of
Professor Herron et al.’s study mentioned above, for example, the authors
also found that 69% of their sample agreed with the statement that “[i]t
should be illegal for anyone to take drone imagery of me on my own
property without my permission.”153 Although this statement includes
imagery of a person (in addition to property) and was not limited
specifically to police drones, their sample’s reactions are consistent with
our findings of high levels of disapproval of surveillance in residential
settings. Our findings are similarly consistent with a study led by Professor
Fradella, who examined the public’s expectations of privacy and compared
them with vignettes reflecting Supreme Court precedent.154 Professor
Fradella et al. do not investigate UAV use per se, but the study also finds
that only 32.5% of respondents concurred with the Riley decision, while
44.4% of respondents concurred with the ruling in Ciraolo.155 The fact that
the public was more closely split with respect the Ciraolo decision (with
40.6% expressing disagreement and 15% expressing neutrality) is also
consistent with our finding of somewhat higher levels of support for UAV
monitoring at 1,000 feet in altitude.
In the future, when the U.S. Supreme Court is faced with a case of highaltitude drone monitoring over real property, the Ciraolo and Riley
precedents would suggest that the justices will elect to allow such
150. See generally Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986).
151. See supra note 144.
152. See generally Sakiyama, supra note 16, at 1039; HERRON ET AL., supra note 16, at 2;
LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 1; MIETHE ET AL., supra note 16, at 1.
153. HERRON ET AL., supra note 16, at 36.
154. See Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 293
(2011).
155. See id. at 365.
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monitoring without a warrant, as long as the police surveil areas that the
public could similarly view while flying over the property.156 Given the
consistency of this line of precedent, it would not be surprising if the
substitution of a UAV flight in place of a piloted police flight would make
no difference in the outcome. However, at least two factors, if altered,
might change this calculus. First, the Court may regard incidents of
repetitive or prolonged UAV surveillance differently, especially if such
surveillance enables police to gather information about individuals’
activities that they otherwise would not be able to access without a warrant.
In fact, recent Supreme Court opinions have begun to recognize that
technologically-assisted, prolonged surveillance of individuals’ public
movements can reveal substantial personal information and may, therefore,
require a warrant.157
The Court has so far explored these concerns under only very limited
circumstances, such as when police attached a “beeper” to monitor the
whereabouts of a private car for over one month or when they obtained
large quantities of stored cellphone location data.158 These cases suggest
that the Court may be moving in the direction of recognizing expanded
privacy interests and limiting prolonged, warrantless surveillance in public
spaces, so the frequency and duration of UAV surveillance (and the Court’s
opinions of the public’s expectations at the time of such a case) will be key
to determining whether or not routine surveillance via UAV would be
considered to be different. As mentioned above, our results and the results
of other studies which have examined the Ciraolo and Riley opinions
suggest that the public’s view of privacy surrounding their homes are more
expansive than the current Supreme Court precedent recognizes.159
One interesting note is that the potential for repetitive or prolonged UAV
surveillance was actually not explicitly discussed on our survey (a duration
was not mentioned), so the public’s reactions to prolonged or repetitive
scenarios may garner even less support than ours did. In a policy sense,
these distinctions are also important for police executives because of the
potential for extremely negative public reactions to UAV monitoring
suggested by our findings. Time- or geographically-limited flights might
theoretically be approved of by greater percentages of the public. Future
work will broaden the categories of information tested to examine further

156. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989); see also California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
157. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
158. See id. at 2212; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 (2012).
159. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450; see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215; Fradella, supra note
154, at 293.
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factors that the public uses in rendering these decisions — for example, the
noise, size, and look of a drone, as well as the duration of the surveillance.
The second factor which may come into play with respect to the Court’s
decision making in future cases is the altitude of the UAV surveillance.
With respect to lower-altitude surveillance, although the Court has not
rendered an opinion concerning UAVs specifically, the Causby case can
provide some guidance as to some of the factors that the Court might
consider.160 If a UAV were to fly so low, to be so noisy, or to be so large
as to pose a safety or other hazard, strong evidence could be marshalled by
the property owners to argue that the UAV had interfered with their use and
enjoyment of the property.161 Thus, this type of UAV flight would seem to
violate the holding of the Causby decision.162 However, with respect to
UAV surveillance, it may be difficult for property owners to utilize Causby
effectively to challenge UAV flights.163 First, the higher a UAV flies, the
harder it will be for the landowners to provide evidence of an interference
with their use and enjoyment. And, perhaps more critically, what
constitutes “interference” may be somewhat subjective — many
individuals may feel that the use of a UAV for photography in more than
very rare instances interferes with their ability to use their property fully —
even if no noise or provable hazard exists. Even if courts are unwilling to
validate this type of more expansive view of an owner’s right to enjoy their
property in an unfettered way, our results suggest that this will not alter the
public’s disapproval of police agencies’ decisions to engage in such
monitoring.
In addition to the magnitude of public disapproval of this type of
monitoring and its disagreement with Supreme Court precedent, police
departments may also want to consider community-specific opinions when
assessing how broad or limited their uses of UAVs should be. Our
multivariable results provide some guidance as to the different factors
which may lead particular communities to be more or less supportive of
UAV flights or CCTVs in residential areas. As discussed above, many of
the results are similar across technologies, signifying that similar predictors
tend to be important across disparities in altitude or type of monitoring
technology. For example, education was a significant predictor of some
increased support for UAV flights at 1,000 feet in altitude and for CCTV
monitoring. Again, this pattern suggests some similarity in the way that
high-altitude UAV and CCTV monitoring were viewed by respondents.

160.
161.
162.
163.

See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Educational differences did not significantly predict attitudes towards 50foot UAV flights. This may be due to the fact that respondents
disapproved of low-altitude flights at such high rates (78.2%) that
distinctions based on education became no longer relevant. Consequently,
even in places where low-altitude flights are legal and in communities with
a highly-educated public, police agencies should think carefully about
conducting such flights without a warrant and should anticipate significant
community criticism if they do.
Similarly, our regressions demonstrated that Republicans were more
likely to support monitoring in all three scenarios, followed by Democrats
and then Independents, who were the least supportive of UAV surveillance
in this sample. This finding is interesting because few existing studies have
connected routine differences in opinions about police UAVs to political
party identification,164 and no study so far has connected political party
differences to variations in support for residential UAV monitoring. Yet,
previous research has suggested that Republicans and political
conservatives tend to trust legal authorities (including police and the
government) at higher-than-average rates.165 This added trust may translate
into a greater willingness to permit police to use advanced technologies
with greater discretion or for a larger variety of functions, including around
homes, where greater trust in the agency operating the drone would seem
particularly important. If it is greater trust in police which explains the
connection between Republican identification and approval of our survey’s
monitoring scenarios, this is also consistent with our findings (described
below) that positive perceptions of police were also significantly correlated
with support for UAV and CCTV monitoring.
Interestingly, however, we did not find significant differences with
respect to the ways in which respondents of different races perceived our
monitoring scenarios. Even if we restrict our inquiry to this sample alone,
the only real discernible difference can be seen in the 1,000-foot
monitoring scenario, where approximately ten percentage points fewer
African Americans supported this function. Yet, this disparity did not
produce a statistically significant result, so we cannot generalize this
finding to the overall population. Consequently, similar to the studies cited
above, our data do not allow for resolution of the question of whether or
not African Americans regard UAV monitoring by the police differently
than do other respondents. Theoretically speaking, a link still seems
possible since African Americans tend to be less trusting of police and

164. See, e.g., LIBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16; MIETHE ET AL., supra note 16.
165. See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 134; Jones, supra note 134.
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perceive them more negatively.166 One explanation may be that a limited
number of factors have been tested within the vignettes examined in the
existing literature so far. Further attention may reveal additional influences
on drone perceptions, but we cannot find evidence of significant race-based
differences in perceptions of the residential monitoring scenarios we tested.
Likewise, in the multivariable models, we find that age is only
significant when respondents considered monitoring via CCTVs.
However, across this survey, we found a particularly consistent pattern of
decreasing approval of police surveillance with each younger age cohort.
Although this effect disappears once other opinion-based predictors are
controlled for, we note the effect here because police agencies may want to
consider the possibility that disapproval may be even more intense among
younger members of the community and, further, that disapproval may
become even more pronounced over time. And although these findings
with respect to age are not significant within the multivariable models, the
results concerning age are consistent with some earlier studies.167 Though
the police cannot control the age distribution of the populations they serve,
they can take these demographic factors into account when designing
policies and assessing how supportive their communities may be over time.
Similarly, this may be something that courts wish to consider as they assess
the changing “expectations of privacy” within the general population.
Taken together, our results suggest that the population will tend to
subscribe to a more (rather than less) expansive zone of privacy over time
when it comes to police monitoring in residential neighborhoods. As we
have argued previously, one reason for this may be that, as more
surveillance technologies are developed and data collections grow,
individuals may become even more aware of the potential problems
inherent in large data collections or the lack of control they have over
information that is collected about their lives. In fact, increased familiarity
with the problems inherent in large-scale technological surveillance and
data collection seems to us to be a reasonable hypothesis as to why younger
individuals answering our survey tended to already be less supportive of
monitoring.
On the other hand, one of the most consistent predictors of more positive
responses to our survey’s vignettes was concern over crime and this
correlation held across both monitoring scenarios and technologies.
Further, other studies examining advanced police technologies with

166. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 121, at 3; see also FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN
POLICING, supra note 121, at 300.
167. See MIETHE ET AL., supra note 16, at 4; see also Sakiyama et al., supra note 16, at
1035.
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surveillance capabilities have produced similar evidence that concern over
crime predicts support.168 Interestingly, one study reported that younger
individuals believed UAV surveillance would increase public safety at
higher rates than did older individuals, a finding which might suggest that
crime concern could moderate the effects of age on support for these
functions.169 Additionally, across all ages, the study found that respondents
who supported UAV use by police did so most often because they believed
UAVs would increase public safety.170 Likewise, in our regressions, the
coefficients attached to the crime concern variables are large enough in
magnitude across all models to underscore the importance of this factor to
communities and police agencies. Police may wish to discuss both
priorities with respect to privacy and with respect to crime concern with
members of their communities when deciding which uses of surveillance
technologies best reflect their communities’ beliefs.
Once these
technologies are in use, police agencies may also wish to document their
specific uses and make this information freely available to the community,
as well as to document the benefits derived from them where possible.
Simultaneously, it may also be helpful to present a transparent set of
limitations on their use to the community in order to provide reassurance
that warrantless monitoring will be severely limited.
Efforts to increase transparency with respect to these technologies and to
engage with the community are particularly important. In fact, our results
demonstrate that community opinions of police agencies matter when it
comes to the public’s willingness to allow police discretion to use both
UAVs and CCTVs. We found a consistent correlation between positive
opinions about police fairness, equality, and respect and support for UAV
monitoring and the effect was even larger for CCTV. Similarly, in the
CCTV model, the belief that “police make good decisions” was also
significant. Overall, though, the impacts of these factors were more modest
than the impacts of concern over crime on support for residential UAV
monitoring. And it is important to note in this context that only those
respondents with extremely positive perceptions of police tended to actually
support UAV or CCTV monitoring in residential areas.
Although the link between police legitimacy and support for advanced
technologies has not been examined frequently in the literature, this finding
is consistent with Professor Heen et al.’s multivariable results suggesting
that perceptions of police legitimacy were an important factor in predicting

168. See Gill et al., supra note 127, at 319; see also Merola & Lum, supra note 124, at
383.
169. See LIEBERMAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.
170. See id. at 1.
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support for the UAV functions examined by their survey.171 These results
also seem consistent with similar findings from a study of LPR cameras
(another technology with locational monitoring capabilities) and with
Professor PytlikZillig et al.’s finding that trust in an organization is one of
the greatest predictors of support for UAV use by that organization.172
We have previously argued that positive police perceptions may provide
a kind of ‘social capital’ that may prompt a community to be more willing
to allow police some discretion to deploy systems of this type.173 This is
also consistent with an argument made in the police legitimacy literature —
that increased legitimacy is associated with community support for policies
that have the effect of expanding police discretion.174 As mentioned above,
a recent survey experiment also found that learning about the use of LPR
cameras tended to reduce trust in police.175 Given these prior results and
the results we have presented above, it seems reasonable to continue to
argue that it is necessary to develop a more systematic understanding of
how technological change in policing may impact police-community
relationships.176 As police continue to adopt and deploy these technologies
at a rapid rate, consultation with the community becomes vitally important.

171. See Heen et al., supra note 16, at 27.
172. See Merola & Lum, supra note 124, at 380; see also PytlikZillig et al., supra note
109.
173. See Merola & Lum, supra note 124, at 384.
174. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy
in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 524 (2003).
175. See Merola et al., supra note 125, at 60.
176. See generally Merola & Lum, supra note 124, at 374; Peter Neyroud & Emma
Disley, Technology and Policing: Implications for Fairness and Legitimacy, 2 POLICING
226, 229 (2008).
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APPENDIX A
Table 1: Sample Characteristics

* The base condition for race includes: Asian (7.3%), Native American
(0.7%), Latino (6.4%), and Other (2.1%).
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APPENDIX B
Figure 1. Approval of police technologies used for neighborhood
monitoring.

UNDERSTANDING THE PUBLIC’S OPINIONS

Note. Base category for political party is ‘Democrat’. Base category for Race is ‘Other’. All models use n = 606.
b = regression coefficient; SE = standard error; β = standardized coefficient.
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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APPENDIX C

Table 2: Models of Respondent Approval of Police UAV and CCTV Usage

